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Abstract:  
 
Previous findings on dishonest behavior revealed that people cheat for better financial 
outcomes when they get the opportunity to do so. Additionally, studies found evidence 
that the extent of dishonesty is affected by how outcomes are framed. People are more 
intent to cheat in order to avoid losing money than in order to enhance gaining money. 
The obtainable payoffs used in these previous studies were certain and assured 
participants that cheating would yield them direct benefits. Current study extends 
previous findings by investigating dishonesty within a probabilistic design containing 
uncertain outcomes. A die-under-cup paradigm was used with framing in terms of loss 
and gain as moderator. In contradiction with previous studies that used certain payoffs, 
current study remarkably shows that participants did not engage in dishonesty under 
uncertain payoffs. Furthermore, no moderating effect of framing was found on dishonest 
behavior using a probabilistic design. This study indicates that uncertain outcomes have a 
different effect on dishonest behavior than certain outcomes have. 
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When people have the opportunity to engage in dishonest behavior for better 
financial outcomes, they often will (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf & de Dreu, 2011; 
Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Yaniv & Siniver, 2016). This opportunity is generally 
seen as having the option to increase payoffs by unethical behavior when being in 
absence of others’ surveillance. When we would feel observed by others we would 
directly diminish our cheating behavior (Covey, Saladin & Killen, 1989), as we might get 
caught and consequently get punished. A way to stress private setting to study dishonesty 
in laboratory experiments is by using the die-under-cup paradigm. Shalvi et al. (2011) 
used this paradigm in studying the extent to which people lie for monetary benefits. 
Participants needed to report the number they privately rolled with a six-faced die by 
shaking an opaque cup that contained this die. A small whole located on top of the cup 
ensured participants that only they could see what number they rolled. According to the 
number reported they received a certain amount of money in EUR. Reporting a 3 for 
instance made participants receive a sure 3EUR. Since rolling the die was completely 
private and therefore no one could ever find out what number the die has shown, it gave 
participants the possibility to cheat by writing down a higher number than actual rolled. 
The distribution of reported numbers was compared to a theoretical distribution of honest 
die rolls and revealed that people cheated. In doing so, lying assured them to increase 
their payoffs. How would this be when cheating does not increase payoffs but instead 
increases the probability to obtain payoffs?  
Probablistic outcome design. Experimental research on dishonesty does mainly 
focus on certain outcomes, while in life situations people do often see opportunity for 
lying under uncertain payoffs as well. In a job performance evaluation one could lie 
about having received a better-paid job offer elsewhere in order to obtain a higher salary. 
Though this will not give the certainty to get the promotion, it increases the probability of 
getting the raise. Dishonesty under uncertain payoffs would either get us profit or leaves 
us with no profit at all. In current study dishonest behavior was further investigated by 
simulating the study of Shalvi et al. (2011) using a die-under-cup paradigm. The main 
difference in current study is that the fixed outcomes, related to numbers reported, were 
replaced by probabilistic outcomes. A probabilistic design is used where rolling the die 
gives a chance of receiving a fixed amount of money. Reporting a 1 for example gives a 
1/6 probability of getting the money as it gives 5/6 probability of getting nothing at all. 
This logically shows that cheating by reporting a higher number increases the chance of 
receiving a payoff. The aim of this study is to see whether probability outcomes have the 
same effect as certain outcomes have on deceiving behavior. The question here is:  
 
Do people show dishonest behavior under uncertain monetary outcomes? 
 
Though there are no clear findings yet showing that people would be dishonest to 
increase the probability to financially benefit, there is reason to assume that people 
would. In an online research by Zimerman, Shalvi and Bereby-Meyer (2014), 376 
participants had to privately toss a coin for twenty times and predict beforehand whether 
the outcome would be heads or tails. They needed to report the outcome for each of the 
twenty tosses and had to mention whether their prediction was right or wrong. In the 
incentivized condition participants would get paid for every correct prediction they made, 
while in the non-incentivized condition only 5 out of 100 randomly chosen participants 
would receive money. In the first condition, participants could make more money by 
lying while in the second condition lying would not make a difference. This research 
showed that those who were financially incentivized to lie, were more likely to show 
dishonesty. They reported a higher number of correctly predicted tosses than those who 
were not financially incentivized to lie. Though certain payoffs were used in the 
incentivized condition, these results give reasons to assume that in current probabilistic 
design people will show dishonest behavior as well since it includes a financial outcome 
to obtain.  
Hypothesis 1: People lie more to increase the probability to obtain financial 
outcomes than would be expected by theoretical chance.   
 
Extent of dishonesty. In gambling, the value of the ‘winning price’ is not exactly 
a linear function of the probability of gaining. Getting either from 0 to something, or 
from a possibility of getting something to the certainty of getting it, has greater impact in 
subjective value compared to a change somewhere in the middle (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984). Assuming that participants would prefer the maximum profit, they therefore will 
not quickly cheat with reporting a 3 when having rolled a 2. It would be more likely to 
report higher numbers as 5 and 6 when actually rolled lower numbers. 
In contrast with all numbers lower than 6, cheating by reporting a six will give 
100% certainty to gain the money and eliminates the risk of getting nothing at all. If 
participants can assure themselves to get the money by fully reducing uncertainty, 
wouldn’t cheating by reporting a 6 be the most likely decision to make? It is shown that 
people in general are risk averse, we rather have certainty over risky outcomes 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Even when a prospect outcome is higher than the certain 
outcome, people would rather assure themselves with the certain outcome. This means 
for example that when people are asked to either have a sure gain of 240EUR or to have 
25% chance to gain 1000EUR people would rather choose for the certain amount of 
money. The subjective value of surely getting the 240EUR is higher than the summed 
subjective value of having the probability to get 1000EUR and the probability of getting 
nothing. There is something inherent attractive in certainty, which is also shown under 
non-monetary outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). When the choice is given to 
either get A. 50% chance of winning a three-week tour of England, France, and Italy or 
B. a sure one-week tour of England, this last option is significantly rather chosen. In the 
choice between A. 5% chance to win a three-week tour of England, France, and Italy or 
B. 10% chance to win a one-week tour of England, the first option is significantly rather 
chosen. Though a three-week tour of three different countries seems more attractive, 
people rather choose for the certain option of only a one week tour of England. The 
certain option here with the less attractive outcome weighs more than the more attractive 
outcome that only has a 50% probability to occur. 
While people prefer certain outcomes over risky outcomes, there is as well reason 
to assume people would not cheat by reporting a 6 but will rather report a 5. When people 
have intentions to deceive in order to receive money they would prefer an intermediate lie 
instead of a major lie. This is among others shown by a cup-under-die study of Shalvi, 
Handgraaf & de Dreu (2011) where participants had the opportunity to receive 2,50EUR 
if they chose to not roll the die. The ones that chose to do roll the die could receive a 
maximum of 5EUR (rolling number 1 = €1, 2 = €2, 3 = €3, 4 = €4, 5 = €5, and 6 = €0). 
Results showed that those who did reject to settle for 2,50EUR more often lied to 
intermediate level by reporting a 4 in order to receive 4EUR while they could have 
reported a 5 to receive the maximum of 5EUR.  
Even though people have the option lie to fullest extent, they won’t choose to do 
so (Fischbaher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). We do desire to maximize our outcomes but we 
still want it to be ‘morally appropriate’ since we have the tendency to feel honest about 
ourselves. Cheating might fulfill the financial desire but it contradicts with our honesty 
norm and undermines the positive beliefs about ourselves, which we prefer to maintain 
(Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008). This internal fight between the desire to financially 
benefit, yet to feel good about the self can cause cognitive dissonance; a psychological 
feeling of discomfort when our actions are in conflict with our beliefs (Festinger, 1962).  
A way to restrict the psychological discomfort is by moral disengagement, taking 
distance from our moral conviction by justifying our actions. We look for information to 
convince ourselves that our unethical behavior is morally permissible (Shu, Gino & 
Bazerman, 2011). Shalvi et al. (2011) included a condition in their die-under-cup study 
where participants had to roll the die three times. Participants were told to get paid 
according to the first die roll and that rolling the die two more times was only to check 
whether the die was functioning. Frequently higher numbers were reported in this 
condition, as the opportunity to roll two additional times gave reasons to justify cheating 
by using observed desired counterfactuals; they saw what they could have had rolled in 
the first place. Having such opportunity to justify our unethical actions can get us more 
balance in our conflicting desires. It would therefore be likely as well to cheat by 
reporting a 5 since it still enhances the chance for the desired outcome, yet keeps it 
possible to justify actions by attributing the winning outcome to luck instead of cheating.  
Both the preference for cheating to extreme extent to avoid uncertainty, as the 
preference for cheating more intermediate extent to justify actions, seems to make sense. 
It is not sure yet whether it is more likely to decide to do the one thing or the other. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1985) have demonstrated with their research that changes in the 
formulation of choices given at hand can already cause preference shifts. The decisions 
people make can be affected by how outcomes are framed. Outcomes can either be 
positive or negative depending on the reference point used. When spoken of advantage 
outcomes people often gain something while in disadvantage outcomes people often lose 
something. Framing outcomes in terms of gain and loss is used as a moderator to predict 
the extent of dishonest behavior, and in particular the preference to cheat by reporting a 5 
or a 6.  
 
Framing and dishonest behavior. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984) we perceive gains and losses differently. Losses seem to loom larger than 
gains, since the negative value of losing has a higher impact than the positive value of 
gaining something. This makes that we are more intent to avoid the chance of losses than 
we are intent to increase the chance of gains. In several studies the effect of framing on 
dishonest behavior was measured (Schindler & Pfattheicher, 2017; Grolleau, Kocher & 
Sutan, 2016). In these studies they used a gain frame condition and a loss frame 
condition. Those in the gain condition could win money during the experiment, while 
those in the loss condition could lose money as the amount was given beforehand. 
Participants that cheated could either increase their gain or diminish their loss. While the 
amount of money they could go home with was objectively seen exactly the same, 
evidence was found for more cheating behavior in the loss frame condition compared to 
the gain condition. This showed people are more likely to show dishonest behavior to 
avoid losses than to increase gains. In current study, using probabilistic outcomes, gain 
and loss conditions were adopted as well to see whether framing moderates the extent of 
dishonesty. Based on previous findings, it was expected that those in the loss condition 
would be more intent to deceive than those in the gain condition. 
Hypothesis 2: People show more dishonesty to eliminate the chance of loss than 
to increase the chance of gain.  
Hypothesis 3: Reports in the gain condition do substantially differ from reports in 
the loss condition.  
Looking more specific at the extent of dishonesty it would be more appropriate to 
lie to extreme extent in order to exclude the possibility to lose than to maximize the 
possibility to win, as losses are weighed more than gains. Particularly since losing in this 
probabilistic designed study means going home with no money at all. Those in the loss 
condition were expected to lie more extreme by reporting more 6’s compared to those in 
the gain condition. In the gain condition was expected that people would lie more at 
intermediate level by reporting more 5’s. 
Hypothesis 4: People in the gain condition will lie more at intermediate level by 
reporting more 5’s compared to the loss condition.  
Hypothesis 5: People in the loss condition will lie more at extreme level by 
reporting more 6’s compared to the gain condition.  
 
Scientific contribution. The purpose of this study was to get an idea on how 
uncertain outcomes affect dishonesty in a die-under-cup paradigm with framing as 
moderator. It contributes in extending knowledge about dishonesty using a probabilistic 
design and in obtaining more insights on how loss and gain frame influences the extent of 
lying. In this paradigm we speak of ‘dishonesty’ when participants report different, 
mostly higher, numbers than they have actually rolled with the die. Dishonesty is in this 
report as well phrased as ‘lying’, ‘cheating’ and ‘deceiving’.  
 
Method 
Participants and design. In this lab-experiment, to study dishonesty under payoff 
uncertainty, one hundred and fifty students of Leiden University (103 women and 47 
men) participated. The participants were recruited on the Faculty of Social Sciences to 
join the experiment. They were told that attending would give them the opportunity to go 
home with 6EUR by filling in a short questionnaire and doing a ball draw lottery, which 
together would take no longer than fifteen minutes. Those who participated did all meet 
the criteria of having a minimum age of eighteen years old. The maximum age in this 
sample is 34 years old with a range of 16 years (M = 21.44, SD = 3.37). The one hundred 
and fifty participants were randomly assigned into two equally sized lab-experimental 
conditions, consisting of a gain frame (48 women and 27 men) and a loss frame (55 
women and 20 men) condition. The mean age in the gain condition is similar to the mean 
age in the loss condition (M = 21.38, SD = 2.615 vs. M = 21.44, SD = 3.373). 
For participating in this study all students, irrespectively the condition, received 1 
ECTS-credit. In total, students did either get 1 credit or 1 credit plus the additional 6EUR, 
depending on a ball draw lottery. Before attending the ball draw lottery participants had 
to fill in a questionnaire, followed by rolling a die and reporting the number rolled. The 
ball draw lottery caused the probabilistic element and was about participants drawing one 
ball out of a box, which contained 6 balls in total that were either white or yellow. 
Drawing a yellow ball meant going home with 6EUR, drawing a white ball meant getting 
no money at all. The number participants have reported in the die roll was related to the 
number of yellow balls in the box. Reporting a 2 for example, would mean that the 
participant had to draw a ball out of a box that contained 2 yellow balls and 4 white balls 
in it (6 balls in total). This gave a chance of 2/6 of getting the money. Reporting higher 
numbers would have increased the chance of going home with 6EUR. The dependent 
variable in this study is the number participants reported. A two-factorial (gain vs. loss) 
between-subjects design was used. 
 
Procedure and frame manipulation. In alternately sequence participants were 
divided in one of the two conditions. The independent variable in this study is the lab-
experimental condition participants were assigned to, which was either gain or loss. To 
manipulate the conditions, participants in the loss frame condition received 6EUR 
beforehand and had the chance of either keeping or losing the amount of money. In the 
gain frame condition, participants did not get this 6EUR beforehand but had the chance 
of winning this amount of money.  
All participants who entered the laboratory did first sign an informed consent that 
stated that participation is completely voluntary, that they could stop participating at any 
moment and that all data collected would be treated confidentially. The informed consent 
gave participants additional information about what they could expect in the experiment. 
To further manipulate the two conditions, participants were given customized informed 
consents framed in terms of gain (Appendix 1) or loss (Appendix 2). For the gain 
condition there was written that they could win 6EUR, depending on a random ball draw 
lottery. If they would draw a yellow ball they win the 6EUR and if they would draw a 
white ball they win nothing. In the loss condition it included the information that they 
would get 6EUR in cash, with having a chance to lose it. Whether they would lose the 
money depended on a random ball draw lottery. If they would draw a yellow ball they 
would keep the 6EUR and if a white ball was drawn they would lose the money.  
After signing the informed consent, those in the loss condition directly received 
the 6EUR from the experimenter and were told to put it in their wallet. Participants were 
assigned to a cubicle equipped with a pen. One of the experimenters handed over the 
questionnaire and requested to stay in the cubicle and to open the door when finished. 
The questionnaire (Appendix 3) contained 44 items about how people attribute events in 
life. The first 16 items formed the Work Locus of Control Scale (Spector, 1988) that 
measures to what extent people internally attribute work related events (e.g., “Promotions 
are given to employees who perform well on the job”; “Making money is primarily a 
matter of good fortune”). Participants indicated in how far they agreed with the items on 
a 6-point scale (1 = disagree very much, 6 = agree very much). The other items in the 
questionnaire formed the FAD-PLUS Free Will and Determinism scale (Paulhus & 
Carey, 2011) that measures to what extent people attribute events and human actions in 
life to free will or to causes external to the will. These items were scored on a 5-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) and can be divided in four subscales: 
Free Will (e.g., “People have complete control over the decisions they make”), Scientific 
Determinism (e.g., “Your genes determine your future”), Fatalistic Determinism (e.g., 
“No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny”) and Unpredictability (e.g., 
“No one can predict what will happen in this world”). The purpose of including the 
questionnaire was for exploratory reasons only, without having à priori Hypotheses. 
Though, it might be interesting to explore whether attribution is related to lying behavior 
or not. Do they, for example, feel in charge to get the 6EUR by reporting higher numbers 
than rolled or do they report honestly and leave it to fate whether they go home with 
6EUR or not.  
When participants finished the questionnaire they opened up the door so the 
experimenter could collect the questionnaire and give the die roll instruction form. 
Participants were again asked to stay in the cubicle and open the door when they were 
done reading the instructions. The instruction form was part of manipulating the two 
conditions. In the gain condition instructions were framed in winning 6EUR (Appendix 
4) while in the loss condition the explanation was framed in terms of losing 6EUR 
(Appendix 5).  
After participants opened the door again, they received a decision sheet framed in 
gain or loss (Appendix 6) and a covered opaque cup with a die in it. The opaque cup had 
a small hole on top through which the participant could look closely to see the die inside 
the cup. As written on the instruction form, all participants were about to pick up the cup, 
shake the cup, put it down on the table and look closely what number was rolled. Next to 
this first roll, they had to check whether the die was legitimate by rolling the die two 
more times. So in total, participants rolled the die three times. After doing so, they had to 
write down the number of their first roll on the decision sheet.  
The instruction included the explanation that the number reported would 
eventually be the number of yellow balls in the ball draw box. After reporting and 
opening the door again, the experimenter brought them (one at the time) to a different 
room for the ball draw. The experimenter opened a box and put in the number of yellow 
and white balls according to the decision sheet participants filled in. After closing the box 
participants could blindly put their hand through a whole in the box to take out one of the 
six balls. When a yellow ball was drawn in the gain condition, participants received 
6EUR from the experimenter. Those who did draw a yellow ball in the loss condition 
where told they could keep the 6EUR. In both conditions, drawing a white ball meant 
going home with no money at all. When drawing a white ball in the gain condition 
participants were told they did not win any money. In the loss condition they were told 
they had to hand in the 6EUR. All participants then signed for having received either 
6EUR or 0EUR and read the debriefing form of the experiment (Appendix 7).  
 
Results 
Comparison to an honest die roll. First of all the total distribution of the collected 
data of one hundred and fifty participants was compared to a uniform equal distribution 
expected from a fair die roll. This is done to test the first Hypothesis that participants lied 
under payoff uncertainty. Here a (two-sided) Non-Parametirc Chi-Square Test was used 
to examine whether the overall distribution of the sample significantly differed from a 
flat line, as expected within a theoretical distribution (since all numbers should be rolled 
equally according to chance). The observed and expected frequencies of the numbers 
rolled in the sample are shown in Table 1 (with an expected frequency of 25 when N = 
150).  
 
Table 1. Observed and expected N of total sample 
 Observed N Expected N Residual 
1 26 25,0 1,0 
2 24 25,0 -1,0 
3 22 25,0 -3,0 
4 28 25,0 3,0 
5 30 25,0 5,0 
6 20 25,0 -5,0 
Total 150   
 
The Non-Parametric Chi-Square Test reveals that the sample distribution did not 
significantly differ from the theoretical flat line distribution, χ2(5, N = 150) = 2.80, p = 
.731. Therefore the Nul-Hypothesis, that people do not report other numbers than would 
be expected on the basis of chance, remains. This indicates that according to the overall 
sample participants did not lie.  
 
The effect of framing. A (two-sided) Non-Parametric Chi-Square Test was 
performed for the conditions separately to see whether Framing has an effect on whether 
people lie. In Hypothesis 2 was expected that there would be shown deceiving behavior 
in both conditions, but mainly in the loss condition. Thus, whether observed frequencies 
of the reported die rolls in either loss or gain condition differ from what would be 
expected by chance (which is a frequency of 12.5 when N = 75). Table 2 shows the 
observed and expected frequencies for the gain and loss condition separately.  
 
 
Table 2. Observed and expected N of gain and loss frame  
COND Observed N Expected N Residual 
Gain Frame 1 10 12,5 -2,5 
2 12 12,5 -,5 
3 11 12,5 -1,5 
4 16 12,5 3,5 
5 19 12,5 6,5 
6 7 12,5 -5,5 
Total 75   
Loss Frame 1 16 12,5 3,5 
2 12 12,5 -,5 
3 11 12,5 -1,5 
4 12 12,5 -,5 
5 11 12,5 -1,5 
6 13 12,5 ,5 
Total 75   
 
Results show that reports in the gain condition (M = 3.57, SD = 1.57) do not significantly 
differ from reports that would be expected by chance, χ2(5, N = 75) = 7.48, p = .187. 
Reports in the loss condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.18) did not differ significantly from a fair 
die roll either, χ2(5, N = 75) = 1.40, p = .924. This shows that framing seems to have no 
effect on the numbers reported. The Nul-Hypothesis remains that people, irrespectively 
of the framing, do not seem to deceive. Looking at the χ2-statistics of both conditions it 
even seems that reports in the loss condition appear to be more similar to a fair die roll 
than reports in the gain condition, χ2= 1.40 vs. χ2= 7.48, which was expected to be the 
other way around.
 
Both, the overall sample as the two conditions separately, appeared to not be 
different from a uniform distribution. To test Hypothesis 3 to see if the reports in the gain 
condition differ from the loss condition a (two-sided) Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test was performed. The absolute mean difference in reports between gain (M = 3.57, SD 
= 1.57) and loss (M = 3.39, SD = 1.78) was .080, which turned out to be not significant, Z 
= .49, p = .970. In contradiction with the expectation, overall reports in the gain condition 
were not different from the overall reports in the loss condition, which does not support 
Hypothesis 3.    
 
Specific reported numbers. Hypothesis 4 and 5 were about specific reported 
numbers. Because the expectations of the reported numbers were about reported 5’s and 
6’s, only these numbers are analyzed. In Hypothesis 4 was expected that people lie more 
at intermediate level in the gain condition by reporting more 5’s compared to the loss 
condition. In comparing the relative frequencies, more 5’s are reported in the gain 
condition than in the loss condition (63.3% vs. 36.7%). To test if these frequencies differ 
significantly there is a (two-sided) 2 (condition: gain vs. loss) x 2 (reported number 5: yes 
vs. no) Chi-Square Test performed with applied continuity correction by the Fisher’s 
Exact Test. Fisher’s Exact Test for reported 5’s shows no significant difference in 
conditions, p = .152. Though in the gain condition it is more tempting to report at 
intermediate level, the test reveals it is not sufficient to state that those in the gain 
condition cheated more by reporting 5’s than in the loss condition.  
Hypothesis 5 expectation was that people in the loss condition would deceive to 
more extreme extent by reporting more 6’s. A (two-sided) 2 (condition: gain vs. loss) x 2 
(reported number 6: yes vs. no) Chi-Square Test was performed to examine if the 
frequencies of reported 6’s do substantially differ in the conditions. For continuity 
correction Fisher’s Exact Test was used. In the loss frame condition people were more 
tempted to report 6’s than in the gain frame condition (65% vs. 35%). Although this 
difference was not significant, p = .229, this indicates that there is no obvious pattern that 
people in the loss condition would lie to more extreme extent by reporting more 6’s.  
 
Attribution of actions. A correlation matrix is made (Table 3) for exploring the 
results of the data collected from the questionnaire. Pearson Correlations are used for the 
interval variables: Locus of Control, Free Will, Scientific Determinism, Fatal 
Determinism, Unpredictability and the variable Report. Spearman Correlations are used 
for the binary variables: Condition, Reported 6’s and Reported 5’s. As the Correlation 
Matrix (Table 3) shows, Locus of control is highly positive correlated with Free Will. 
When people feel more in control of events that happen in life they will also have higher 
ability to feel more responsible for courses of their actions. Free Will is positively 
correlated with Unpredictability, it seems that those who think people are responsible for 
their own actions do also think it’s hard to predict how people will behave in the future.     
There is a negative correlation between Locus of Control and the other attributes 
as Scientific Determinism and Fatal Determinism. For unpredictability this correlation is 
even highly negative. This shows that the more you feel for internal attribution, where 
people see themselves in charge of certain behaviors and events to happen, the less 
external attributions as science and fate are seen as causes of behaviors and events. The 
higher the internal locus of control, the more actions and events are seen as predictable 
because people are hold responsible for what will happen in the future. Furthermore, the 
Correlation Matrix reveals that all external attributions; Fatal Determinism, Scientific 
Determinism and Unpredictability, are highly positively correlated with each other. 
People that determine events and behavior as a result of fate are also more likely to 
believe in science as a cause, and do think more often that the things that happen in life 
are unpredictable.  
No significant correlations are found between the way people attribute and the 
number they reported in the die roll. It therefore seems there is no indication to assume 
that the way people determine life events and behavioral actions are of predicted value 
for dishonest behavior.  
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of questionnaire scales and reports 
 N SD Locus of 
Control 
Free Will Scientific 
Determ. 
Fatal Determ. Unpredic
tability 
Locus of Control 147 7,02               .73     
Free Will 145 3,81 .36
**
 .49    
Scientific Determ. 146 3,25 -,16
*
 ,12                 .62   
Fatal Determ. 146 3,16 -,21
*
 ,10 ,30
**
                 .49  
Unpredictability 142 4,20 -,23
**
   .19
*
 ,22
**
 ,31
**
 .52 
Condition 147   ,50 -,01    ,04   -,06   ,05   ,14 
Report 147 1,68 ,05 ,15 -,01 ,10 ,08 
Report_6 147   ,34 ,13   ,08   -,09   ,10   -,01 
Report_5 147   ,40 -,09   ,10   ,12   -,02   ,12 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Discussion 
In contradiction with expectations regarding Hypothesis 1, participants showed no 
overall dishonest behavior under payoff uncertainty. The numbers reported were close to 
the numbers expected from a fair die roll. Interesting finding is that under uncertainty of 
payoff people do not seem to lie. A possible explanation can be the weighing of 
(un)certainty (Tversky & Fox, 1995). We know certain outcomes are attractive compared 
to uncertain outcomes; but when certainty is taken away, choice preferences can shift. It 
seems we do not always perceive probabilities as how they objectively are. We weigh 
some probabilities more than others. The subjective weighing determines our decisions, 
not necessarily the objective probabilities given. A higher probability of something to 
happen, in this experiment for example to draw a yellow ball and get 6EUR, is often 
underweighted. Lower probabilities or small outcomes are often overweighed. It 
therefore could have been that those who rolled lower numbers overestimated the chance 
of drawing a yellow ball, what might have influenced the decision to report honestly 
instead of lying by reporting higher numbers. 
An additional explanation can come from mental accounting perspective (Thaler, 
1985). Mental accounting is the idea that we have several accounts in our minds when it 
comes to money. Monetary decisions are depending on the mental account we connect 
our money to. We for example have a wealth account for pension savings but we have a 
windfall account for unexpected income as well, such as winning a lottery. Unexpected 
outcomes are treated completely different. For instance, people win 300EUR on one day 
and go out for dinner the next day and spend 225EUR with the win of yesterday in mind, 
while they normally would never spend that much money in a restaurant (Thaler, 1985). 
The unexpectedness gives the money a different subjective value because being used 
from the windfall account. The use of the uncertainty of the ball draw lottery might have 
influenced the decision making process. Though the possibility to go home with 6EUR 
was not unexpected, it was not sure whether they eventually would or would not receive 
the money (except for reported 6’s). Seen from mental accounting perspective, the money 
participants could win or lose in the lottery can be mentally budgeted from the windfall 
account. The uncertain outcomes with low subjective value might therefore not have been 
worth the lie at the cost of the self-concept. 
 Other than expected in Hypothesis 2, there was as well no sign of dishonesty 
under uncertain outcomes for the gain and loss condition separately. Framing seemed to 
have no effect in this study and it is not sure in how far the probabilistic design has 
influenced this. Remarkable is that the reports in the gain condition seemed to deviate 
more from a fair die roll than those reported in the loss condition. Participants in the loss 
condition probably did not feel for lying at all. That rises the question what could have 
caused this inconsistency with results of previous studies, as the study of Schindler and 
Pfattheicher’s (2017). They did find an effect of framing and showed that those in the 
loss condition cheated more. The difference in the results of their study compared to this 
study can possibly be explained by the procedural differences. In their study the materials 
were located in the cubicles and they used envelopes to put in the money, where no 
experimenters were involved. In current experiment the experimenters were closely 
involved. They assigned them to a cubicle and interacted with them at several times by 
giving the questionnaire, instruction form and die-cup. But explicitly for the loss 
condition, they handed the 6EUR personally to participants. Though the setting was 
provided with a closed cubicle and a die in a cup so that cheating would never be 
discovered, the appearance of the experimenters might have influenced participant’s 
behavior. In a social study (Houser, Vetter & Winter, 2012) using a dictator game was 
shown that people cheat more when another party gave them either no money, little 
money or let them feel they were treated unfairly by this person. A violated social norm, 
being good for one another, seems to give more justification for dishonesty. This might 
have been the other way around in this experiment, where cheating might have felt the 
opposite of righteous. Let’s look at it from reciprocity perspective, which is according to 
Gouldner (1960) about the “mutually gratifying pattern of exchanging goods and 
services” (p. 9). When people receive gifts or services from one another they often feel 
for doing so in return. It is about the social norm that if others are good to you, you 
cannot return with bad but you need to do good as well. The 6EUR participants in the 
loss condition received can be seen as a kind gesture of the experimenter. As in; you are 
good to me by giving me 6EUR, what makes me feel oblige to repay you. Cheating might 
feel as misusing the kind gesture by the ruled underlying reciprocity norm. In following 
research the envelope strategy should be included to diminish the possible feeling of 
personal attachment towards actions of the experimenters. 
The direction of reported numbers in the gain versus the loss condition were in 
line with expectations. Relatively seen there were more 5’s reported in the gain condition 
(Hypothesis 4) and more 6’s reported in the loss condition (Hypothesis 5). But there is no 
sufficient evidence obtained to conclude that these reports significantly differ and that 
framing had effect on the extent of lying. This is not that strange since there was no 
evidence found of lying behavior at all. It is therefore difficult to speculate about the 
extent of dishonesty. I could be that the consideration of what number to cheat with has 
been mentally difficult. The number cheated with should be sufficient to increase the 
chance of going home with 6EUR but perhaps needed to look plausible as well. If you 
would still end up getting nothing, then lying did not pay off at all. Would it be worth 
lying at the cost of the self-concept if you still don’t know whether it will payoff? In 
research of Iyengar & Lepper (2000) was shown that many choices are not always 
attractive but rather overwhelming. More choices can come along with more difficulty 
and frustration in considering what to decide. It leaves people with the doubt whether the 
decision would be satisfying enough. Though this study had to do with consumer choices, 
it might as well be applicable for the consideration process of what number to cheat with. 
If you have a binary cheating paradigm, it leaves you with only one decision to make; 
you either cheat or you don’t. For example using a coin toss, were flipping one side of the 
coin is incentivized with money and the other side is not. Cheating here would seem more 
reasonable since there is a 50% chance of actually having rolled the incentivized side. 
Such paradigm leaves less consideration than current paradigm where people can cheat 
by choosing out of several numbers to report. It furthermore is less reasonable to have 
actually rolled a 5 or a 6 because of the 16.7% chance for each number to occur. The 
difficulty and complexity of a decision to make influences the overwhelming feeling of 
choice overload (Chernev, Böckenholt & Goodman, 2015). It therefore might have been 
mentally easier to just report the number that was actually rolled, with still having a 
possibility to receive money, than to consider what number to cheat with.  
 
This study indicates that with use of a probabilistic design people show no 
dishonest behavior. Further research should broaden the effect of uncertainty on 
dishonest behavior by including a control condition with certain outcomes to compare 
these reports with reports of a probabilistic outcome condition. This might give a better 
view of the role of uncertainty and makes comparing to a certainty paradigm more 
possible. It would as well be a more specific way to look at the effects of framing and it’s 
extent in cheating behavior. This will exclude the ignorance whether uncertain outcomes 
have influenced the effect of framing or not. To furthermore eliminate the chance of 
experimenter bias, experimenters should be kept out of sight as best as possible. Money 
should not be handed to participants but should for instance already have been prepared 
in the cubicles.  
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Appendix 1 Informed Consent Gain Frame 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you can win six Euro. Whether you win, will depend on a random 
ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you 
draw a yellow ball, you win € 6. If you draw a white ball, you win nothing. Before the 
ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire.  
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially.  
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. 
Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name Signature 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Appendix 2 Informed Consent Loss Frame 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you get six Euro in cash. Whether you may keep this money, 
however, will depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that 
contains yellow and white balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you may keep the € 6. If you 
draw a white ball, you lose the money. Before the ball draw you will first fill in a 
questionnaire. 
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially. You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please 
contact dr. W. Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
Name Signature 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Appendix 3 Questionnaire 
 
Experiment: Uncertain Events  Participant number: _____________ 
Please give us the following information about yourself  
I am a      □ Man 
□ Woman 
□ Different  or  I don’t want to tell 
 
I am ________ years old. 
 
How often have you participated in similar experiments at the Faculty of Social Sciences? 
□ Never: This is my first time 
□ Once before: This is the second experiment i participate in 
□ Twice before: This is the third experiment i participate in 
□ Three times before: This is the fourth experiment i participate in 
□ I have been participating in more than three experiments before 
 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                     strongly 
disagree                         agree 
A job is what you make of it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
On most jobs, people can pretty much accomplish whatever they set out to 
accomplish. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If you know what you want out of a job, you can find a job that gives it to 
you. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If employees are unhappy with a decision made by their boss, they should 
do something about it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Making money is primarily a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most people are capable of doing their jobs well if they make the effort. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
In order to get a really good job you need to have family members or 
friends in high places. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are usually a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
When it comes to landing a really good job, who you know is more 
important than what you know. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are given to employees who perform well on the job. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
To make a lot of money you have to know the right people. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
It takes a lot of luck to be an outstanding employee on most jobs. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
People who perform their jobs well generally get rewarded for it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most employees have more influence on their supervisors than they think 
they do. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
The main difference between people who make a lot of money and people 
who make a little money is luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Please turn over. 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                strongly 
disagree                    agree 
I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete control over the decisions they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. 1     2     3     4     5 
Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human 
behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
No one can predict what will happen in this world. 1     2     3     4     5 
People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
Fate already has a plan for everyone. 1     2     3     4     5 
Your genes determine your future. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 1     2     3     4     5 
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. 1     2     3     4     5 
Science has shown how your past environment created your current 
intelligence and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
People are unpredictable. 1     2     3     4     5 
Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. 1     2     3     4     5 
Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete free will. 1     2     3     4     5 
Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. 1     2     3     4     5 
People are always at fault for their bad behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. 1     2     3     4     5 
What happens to people is a matter of chance. 1     2     3     4     5 
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s futures cannot be predicted. 1     2     3     4     5 
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the BEST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave competitively and they behave cooperatively. □  
□ We both behave cooperatively. □  
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the WORST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave cooperatively and they behave competitively. □  
□ We both behave competitively. □  
Please open the door and wait for the experimenter! 
 
Appendix 4 Instructions Gain Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be 
anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the 
experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any 
questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
In this experiment, you can win a prize of €6. There will be 6 coloured balls, either white or 
yellow, which are placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which determines 
whether you win €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you win €6; if the ball you draw is white you 
win nothing. At the beginning of the experiment, there are 6 white balls in the bowl. The number 
of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you 
have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. 
You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a 
look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice 
will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the 
decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome 
of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we 
ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the 
dice is legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will give you a 
"decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the dice three times, tick 
on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave the cup next to the computer. 
Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., 
replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), 
then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you receive €6 
and sign for receiving the money. If the ball you draw is white you will receive no money.  
 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al 
je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je 
beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen 
van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt 
kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Tijdens dit experiment kan je €6 winnen. Er zullen 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak 
gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur 
deze heeft. Als de bal geel is win je €6; als de bal wit is win je niks. Aan het begin van het 
experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal 
vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen.  
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone 
dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In 
deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen 
schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je 
door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat 
je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de 
beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat 
vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te 
gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider 
brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer 
hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te 
kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan 
de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal 
terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
 
 
Appendix 5 Instructions Loss Frame English and Dutch 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will be 
anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by the 
experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have any 
questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions privately. 
 
General framework of the experiment 
 
You just received €6 which is now yours. A ball draw will determine whether you lose this 
money. In this experiment 6 coloured balls, either white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. 
You have to randomly draw one ball which determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you 
draw is yellow you may keep your €6; if the ball you draw is white you lose your money and you 
need to hand in your €6. At the beginning of the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the 
bowl. The number of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More precisely, you 
have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover allows you to see the dice. 
You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down and, without moving the cup, take a 
look through the hole to observe the outcome of your throw. The number displayed by the dice 
will determine the number of yellow balls that will replace the white balls in the bowl (the 
decision sheet indicates the number of yellow and white balls according to each possible outcome 
of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first roll, we 
ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for yourself that the 
dice is legitimate. Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the 
experimenter will give you a "decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After 
rolling the dice three times, tick on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. 
Leave the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the 
experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as the 
number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball from the bowl. 
If this ball you draw is yellow you keep your €6 and sign for the money. If the ball you draw is 
white you will have to give your €6 to the experimenter. 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen beslissingen. Al 
je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt gevraagd om je 
beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het experiment zult ontvangen 
van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute beslissingen.  
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je vragen hebt 
kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
 
Je hebt zojuist €6 ontvangen wat nu van jou is. Je trekt zo een balletje, en daarvan hangt af of je 
dit geld verliest. Tijdens dit experiment zullen er 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak 
gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur 
deze heeft. Als de bal geel is mag je je €6 houden; als de bal wit is moet je je €6 inleveren. Aan 
het begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de 
witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen. 
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een gewone 
dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker die is afgedekt. In 
deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om de dobbelsteen te rollen 
schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder de beker te bewegen, kijk je 
door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat 
je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de 
beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen dat 
vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog tweemaal te 
gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De proefleider 
brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de dobbelsteen drie keer 
hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te 
kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan 
de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal 
terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder te kijken, een bal mag pakken. 
Appendix 6 Decision Sheet Gain and Loss 
 
Number 
displayed by 
the dice 
Number of 
yellow balls 
Number of 
white balls 
You win 
(if you draw a 
yellow ball) 
Tick the 
number rolled 
(X) 
Aantal ogen op 
de dobbelsteen 
Aantal gele 
ballen 
Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een gele 
bal pakt win 
je: 
Kruis het 
aantal ogen 
aan (X) 
 1 5 €6  
 2 4 €6  
 3 3 €6  
 4 2 €6  
 5 1 €6  
 6 0 €6  
 
Number 
displayed by 
the dice 
Number of 
yellow balls 
Number of 
white balls 
You will lose  
(if you draw a 
white ball) 
Tick the 
number rolled 
(X) 
Aantal ogen op 
de dobbelsteen 
Aantal gele 
ballen 
Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een witte 
bal pakt verlies 
je: 
Kruis het 
aantal ogen 
aan (X) 
 1 5 -€6  
 2 4 -€6  
 3 3 -€6  
 4 2 -€6  
 5 1 -€6  
 6 0 -€6  
 
Appendix 7 Debriefing Form 
 
Thank you for participating in this study!  
 
The general purpose of this research is to investigate whether people report a different 
outcome of a dice roll than what they actually rolled when this behavior increases the 
likelihood to get a desired outcome (6 Euro cash), and whether this depends on framing 
(i.e., whether the ball draw is about winning 6 Euro or about not losing 6 Euro).  
In this study we recruited students at Leiden University who were randomly assigned to 
the loss frame condition and gain frame condition. You were asked to perform a different 
version of the dice under the cup paradigm. Specifically, you were asked to choose 
randomly a ball out of a container filled with six balls after rolling a regular six face dice. 
Firstly, the container was filled with six white balls. After the dice-roll, these balls were 
replaced with yellow balls depending on the report of the die roll. Every participant had 
to pick up randomly one ball from the container. In the gain frame condition the 
participant got the cash amount if he/she catch the yellow ball. If he/she catch the white 
ball, he/she did not receive the cash amount of six Euros. In the loss frame condition the 
participant got the cash amount before the dice roll. If he/ she catch the yellow ball, 
he/she could keep the money. If he/she catch the white ball, the had to turn the 6 euros 
back. 
In the loss-frame manipulation we expect that people will over-report 6 to fully remove 
the uncertainty and will under-report the outcomes below 6; in the gain-frame we expect 
that people will under-report 6 because this remove the chance to attribute extrinsically 
the desired outcome to luck and over-report 5 and maybe also 4.  
If you have further questions about the study, please ask the experimenter. You can also 
receive a research report; if you want this, please leave your email address on the reverse 
side of this form. If you have any complaints, you can contact dr. W. Steinel 
(wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl). 
You now have knowledge of relevant information concerning the research. We ask you to 
treat these information as confidential until the end of the study:  
 
 
Please do not talk about this study with other people, not to 
influence the behavior of future participants! Thank you! 
 
 
 
Please send me a research report: 
Name Email address 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
